Background: Most quality metrics focus on underuse of services, leaving unclear what factors are associated with potential overuse.
imaging, 88.2% received radiography, while 11.8% received CT/MRI as their initial study. White patients received higher levels of imaging than black patients or those of other races. Medicaid patients received less rapid or advanced imaging than other patients. Patients had higher levels of imaging if their primary care physician worked in large practices. Compared with no incentives, clinical quality-based incentives were associated with less advanced imaging (10.5% vs 1.4% for within 28 days; PϽ.001), whereas incentive combinations including satisfaction measures were associated with more rapid and advanced imaging. Results persisted in multivariate analyses and when the outcome was redefined as the number of imaging studies performed.
Conclusions: Rapidity and modality of imaging for LBP is associated with patient and physician characteristics but the directionality of associations with desirable care processes is opposite of associations for measures targeting underuse. Metrics that encompass overuse may suggest new areas of focus for quality improvement.
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I
NSURERS PRESS FOR STANDARDized measurement of physicians' performance to broaden programs that link performance to financial incentives. Existing metrics focus on patient experience, relative costs for comparable conditions, and clinical quality. Yet most currently available measures on clinical quality focus on the underuse of services. 1 Few focus on the overuse of services that might induce harm through complications from unnecessary follow-up testing or treatment 2 and/or raise health care costs with little improvement in outcomes. Moreover, if patients tend to prefer more rather than fewer services, programs that only measure underuse but omit overuse may induce even more overuse of services.
Policy makers call for the development of overuse measures and their inclusion in performance measurement and incentive programs, 3 yet little is known about the patterns of care that these measures would reveal. To help anticipate the effects of applying overuse measures, we investigated associations between characteristics of patients and their primary care physicians (PCPs) and the rapidity and modality of imaging those patients receive for uncomplicated acute low back pain (LBP). We focused on LBP as a prevalent condition 4 for which imaging-particularly with advanced modalities-is rarely indicated, even for elderly patients. [5] [6] [7] 
METHODS
DATA SOURCES
We analyzed claims data for Medicare fee-forservice beneficiaries treated by respondents to . Details on the survey and its linkage to Medicare claims are described elsewhere. 8, 9 Our analysis focuses on CTS primary care physicians (ie, specialties of general internal medicine, general practice, family practice, internal medicine/pediatrics, geriatrics). The pooled data set included information on 4567 unique PCPs and 3 years of claims for each beneficiary (Figure 1) .
STUDY DESIGN
We used the first year of observation in each 3-year period to identify exclusion criteria and adjust for comorbidities. Using the second year of observation, we identified beneficiaries as having an episode of acute LBP if they had relevant diagnostic codes from an ambulatory or emergency department visit but lacked similar diagnostic codes within the 6 previous months. To assess imaging, we examined Medicare claims from inpatient, outpatient, and professional services files to detect radiologic studies of the lower back within 6 months of the incident LBP diagnosis. We derived diagnostic codes used to identify LBP and procedure codes used to identify imaging procedures from the measure of inappropriate imaging for LBP developed by the National Committee on Quality Assurance (NCQA).
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RESPONSIBLE PHYSICIANS AND THEIR PRACTICES
Starting with the earlier round of the CTS survey, we used the Unique Physician Identification Number (UPIN) to identify the physician who billed for the greatest number of evaluation and management visits during the entire observation period ( January 1, 2000, through June 30, 2002) for a given beneficiary. We similarly identified eligible PCPs from the later round of the survey using claims for years 2004 to 2006. We focused on beneficiaries whose "plurality" physician was a CTS PCP. To assess the robustness of our results to methods of attribution, we conducted 2 separate analyses attributing beneficiaries who (1) had any evaluation and management visits with the CTS PCP during the observation period and (2) had their initial LBP diagnosis coded by the CTS PCP. To identify whether the imaging study was conducted in the same organization in which the CTS PCP worked, we used the tax identification number associated with each physician's UPIN on claims. 
PATIENT POPULATION
OUTCOME MEASURES
In primary analyses, we examined the rapidity and modality of imaging. We defined rapidity of imaging as an ordinal variable based on timing of the first imaging study-no imaging (none within 180 days of diagnosis), delayed (within 29-180 days), or rapid (within 28 days). Modality of imaging was defined as a separate ordinal variable-no imaging, radiography only, or computed tomography or magnetic resonance imaging (CT/MRI). The CT/MRI category included patients who received radiography and CT/MRI concurrently or serially. In secondary analyses, we considered the number of imaging studies performed within 180 days (none, 1, or Ͼ1).
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
We included patient sex, race (white, black, or other [because data on other racial categories in Medicare data are not as reliable]), and Medicaid eligibility, while adjusting for comorbidities. 11, 12 Drawing on data from the Area Resources File, we also adjusted for median household income in the beneficiary's zip code, and the percentage of adults 25 years and older in the county with 12 or more years of education, as aggregate measures of sociodemographic status. 
PHYSICIANS' FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
We assessed the rapidity and modality of imaging relative to PCPs' self-reported financial incentives, which included the following: (1) practice ownership (employed, part owner, or full owner); (2) the overall effect of incentives, derived from responses to the question "How would you describe your overall personal financial incentives in your practice? On balance, do these incentives favor reducing services to individual patients, favor expanding services to individual patients, or favor neither?"; and (3) a composite 9-category variable constructed from a set of questions identifying factors on which physicians' compensation was based (only his or her own productivity; only clinical quality measures; only patient satisfaction surveys; productivity and clinical quality measures; productivity and patient satisfaction surveys, clinical quality measures and patient satisfaction surveys, all 3, or none; and solo practice physicians who were not asked questions on incentives). We did not include in this composite responses about physicians' exposure to incentives based on cost profiling because this variable was not associated with rapidity or modality of imaging in bivariate or multivariate analyses.
OTHER PHYSICIAN AND PRACTICE CHARACTERISTICS AND AREA FACTORS
We considered the individual physician's specialty (family/ general practice vs general internal medicine); number of years in practice; board certification; and medical school site (United States/Canada vs elsewhere). Practice characteristics included type (solo/2-person practice, small group of 3-10, medium group of 11-50, large groups of Ͼ50, medical school, group/staff health maintenance organization, and all other types); and the percentage of practice revenues derived from Medicare, Medicaid, and capitation (each categorized as tertiles). We adjusted for radiologist supply (number of patient care radiologists per capita in the metropolitan statistical area), and urban vs rural location. 13 Finally, to control for unmeasured market factors, we included a dummy for each of the 60 metropolitan areas in the CTS sample.
CLINICAL EVENTS
Using claims from the 6-month period subsequent to LBP diagnosis, we examined the rate of potential "cascade effects" of imaging and clinical conditions that might post hoc justify imaging that beneficiaries received as well as its rapidity. We considered (1) hospitalization or surgery for LBP, 14 (2) complications or progression of LBP, and (3) new diagnoses of low back fractures or cancers with potential for bone metastases (eTable 2).
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
We performed ordered logit regressions with either the rapidity or modality of imaging as the dependent variable (the referent was no imaging). To assess whether associations between the CTS PCPs' characteristics and imaging were influenced by care delivered by other physicians, we repeated analyses excluding beneficiaries who had visits with physicians other than the CTS PCP between the dates of LBP diagnosis and imaging (or within 6 months for beneficiaries who did not receive imaging). To account for secular trends, we also evaluated the interaction between each performance incentive variable and the period of the survey (2000-2002 or 2004-2006) . Analyses were conducted using SUDAAN analytic software (release 7.0; Research Triangle Institute International, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina), which accounts for clustering of patients within physicians and multiple observations of physicians responding to both survey rounds. We applied weights to reflect the probability of sampling and known differences between respondents and nonrespondents. Weighted estimates are representative of nonfederal PCPs providing patient care at least 20 hours per week in the continental United States and the Medicare beneficiaries whom they treat.
RESULTS
Of 496 529 beneficiaries who met inclusion criteria and had a CTS PCP, 35 039 had a diagnosis of uncomplicated acute LBP during the 6-month assessment period (Figure 2) . Table 1 gives the characteristics of their CTS PCPs. Among these beneficiaries, 11 294 (32.2%) had at least 1 imaging study within 180 days of diagnosis; 9637 (28.8%) underwent imaging within 28 days of diagnosis, and 1657 (4.6%) between 28 and 180 days. Among these patients, 88.2% had a plain radiograph, while 11.8% had CT or MRI as their initial study. The median number of days between diagnosis and imaging was zero (interquartile range [IQR], 0-7) for any modality, 11 (IQR, 2-42) for CT, and 10 (IQR, 
SITE AND RAPIDITY OF IMAGING
In a third of cases (29%), beneficiaries received imaging within their CTS PCP's practice organization. In bivariate analyses, the site of imaging was not associated with the CTS PCP's practice ownership status (data not shown). This held true irrespective of imaging modality. However, time between diagnosis and imaging was significantly shorter for beneficiaries who received imaging within their CTS PCP's practice vs those undergoing imaging elsewhere (mean, 9.5 vs 15.7 days).
IMAGING AND PATIENTS' SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
Minority beneficiaries received less rapid and less advanced imaging than white beneficiaries (24 (Table 2) . Beneficiaries treated by CTS PCPs with variable compensation based only on patient satisfaction received more rapid and advanced imaging than beneficiaries whose PCPs were exposed to other combinations of incentives (Table 2 and Table 3 ). In contrast, beneficiaries whose CTS PCP was exposed to incentives based on both clinical quality and satisfaction, but not productivity, received less rapid imaging. These associations with financial incentives persisted in multivariate analyses. Interactions between the round of the survey and each combination of incentives were nonsignificant.
IMAGING AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF PCPs AND THEIR PRACTICES
Beneficiaries treated by family and general practitioners consistently received less rapid and less advanced imaging than those cared for by general internists (Table 2) . Beneficiaries with CTS PCPs in practices of 10 or more physicians were more likely to receive imaging within 28 days than those seeing physicians in solo or 2-person practices. In adjusted analyses, beneficiaries treated in larger group practices were also substantially more likely to receive advanced imaging (Table 3) . 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
Ourcorefindingsofassociationsbetweenthelevelofimaging and patient and physician characteristics persisted across a range of sensitivity analyses. Results were similar when we attributed beneficiaries who had any visits with the CTS PCP to that PCP and when we attributed to each CTS PCP only beneficiaries for whom they had coded the initial LBP diagnosis. Our results were also robust when we redefined the level of imaging as the total number of low back imaging studies that a beneficiary received.
CLINICAL EVENTS AFTER DIAGNOSIS OF LBP
Rates of new cancer diagnoses were similar regardless of the timing or modality of imaging ( Table 4) . Hospitalization for and complications or progression of back pain were more common among beneficiaries who received imaging than among those who did not.
COMMENT
This study focused on the use of imaging for uncomplicated acute LBP because it is prevalent, and wellestablished guidelines indicate that rapid or advanced imaging is not beneficial in the absence of specific complicating features or comorbid conditions. [5] [6] [7] We found that rapidity and modality of imaging for LBP was associated with nonclinical characteristics of patients and the physicians and practices that treated them. Low-income and minority patients and those treated in smaller practices or practices more reliant on Medicaid revenues received less rapid and advanced imaging than higher-income or white patients and those in larger practices or settings less reliant on Medicaid. These results are consistent with previously reported patterns of care in terms of groups who tend to receive fewer services, although in our study, the patterns represent better quality care than when measuring quality in terms of underuse. 15, 16 Our findings were consistent across the timing or number of imaging studies and for all modalities. Moreover, patients cared for by physicians exposed to incentives based on patient satisfaction received more rapid and advanced imaging. Conversely, those whose physicians were exposed to both clinical quality and productivity incentives received less rapid and advanced imaging.
The association between exposure to satisfaction incentives and the level of imaging is not unexpected. Patients may consider imaging reassuring, and those with higher socioeconomic status may be more successful in obtaining testing in this context. 17 However, in contrast to generally underused services such as diabetic monitoring, more rapid or advanced imaging for LBP may not benefit patients and may result in harm. 18, 19 Contrary to our hypothesis that incentives focused on underuse might result in greater potential overuse, we observed an inverse association between exposure to clinical quality incentives and the level of imaging. These results should be interpreted with caution because we had only a small number of observations for some combina- tions of incentives. Nevertheless, they suggest that qualitybased incentives may improve appropriateness of care in some unmeasured arenas. This could reflect a broad ecologic effect if physicians exposed to existing incentives become more generally aware of and adherent to clinical practice guidelines. 20 Alternatively, physicians exposed to quality measurement may be less vulnerable to the effects of incentives that encourage imaging.
We also found that exposure to both clinical quality and satisfaction incentives among a small fraction of PCPs resulted in less rapid or advanced imaging than with either incentive alone or no incentives at all. Although some prior studies suggest that patient satisfaction tends to correlate with clinical quality, 21, 22 Landon et al 23 compared the experiences of Medicare beneficiaries in the fee-forservice vs managed care programs and found instead that the 2 systems had different strengths in quality vs satisfaction performance. Our findings are also consistent with those of Weyer et al, 24 who reported that improvements in preventive services were associated with declines in patient satisfaction. Although our results require confirmation in larger populations of physicians facing this relatively rare combination of incentives, it is possible that physicians less pressured to maximize visit volume can better align their efforts to perform well on both clinical quality and patient satisfaction (eg, by spending more time providing reassurance about deferred imaging). However, these benefits would accrue to relatively few patients because far more physicians face productivity incentives than other types of incentives. 25 We found that one-third of imaging studies were performed within the PCP's practice organization and that patients treated in large group practices were modestly more likely to receive rapid and advanced imaging than those treated in smaller practices. Since large groups are more likely to have the resources to invest in imaging equipment, 26 our results are consistent with other studies suggesting that practice-owned equipment results in supplier-induced demand and physician self-referral. 27 These associations were independent of the higher likelihood that physicians in large practices were exposed to performance incentives. They contrast with studies showing that larger practices tend to outperform smaller ones in quality improvement efforts and on standardized measures emphasizing underuse. 15, 28, 29 Finally, we found that many patients received imaging on the day of diagnosis. These care patterns are inconsistent with guidelines that recommend a trial of conservative therapy first and suggest opportunities for quality improvement.
Our results should be interpreted within the context of our analytic approach. We could not determine appropriateness of imaging for a given patient. Ours is a comparative analysis of the level of imaging relative to patient, physician, and practice characteristics and not an attempt to benchmark the behavior of individual physicians. The inability to identify particular cases of overuse with certainty does not invalidate our findings because all physicians are subject to such errors in coding and ascertainment. As an example, for our results to be biased, physicians would have to be more likely to code diagnoses of "red flag" conditions for minority patients than for white patients at the same time that they are less likely to order imaging studies for minority patients. Although rates of back pain complications and hospitalizations was higher for patients receiving more rapid or advanced imaging, these differences may reflect, in part, events triggered by the initial imaging study itself and/or the relative aggressiveness of care delivered by physicians who are more likely to order imaging. Rates of can- b Adjusted for beneficiary age, sex, Medicaid eligibility, race, and Klabunde and Charlson comorbidity scores; median household income and percentage of adults 25 years or older with at least 12 years of education in the beneficiary's zip code; the CTS PCP's specialty, number of years in practice, board certification status, site of medical school, practice ownership status, and exposure to financial incentives based on performance on quality, profiling, patient satisfaction, or productivity; type and size of the CTS PCP's practice, as well as the percentage of its revenues derived from Medicare, Medicaid, and capitation; urban vs rural location; radiologist supply per 1000 capita in the CTS PCP's county; and the round of the survey (2000-2001 or 2004-2005) 
